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1. Introduction 
Every year around the world, millions of animals are used in various types of scientific 
research. A comprehensive global estimate for this figure is 115.3 million.
2
  Australia appears 
to rank highly both in terms of absolute laboratory animal usage figures, and per capita use, 
being ranked fourth largest in the world in 2005. 
3
 The most recent statistics available suggest 
Australian usage figures in the order of 7 million animals.
4
  
The extent of this use, the purported benefits to the Australian public, and the fact that 
the majority of biomedical research is government funded,
5
 make this is a public policy issue. 
As with other animal welfare issues, the surrounding debate is polarised, and involves 
                                                          
1
 Alexandra Whittaker is a veterinarian and a Bachelor of Laws (LLB) student at the University of New 
England, NSW, Australia. She is also a lecturer at the School of Animal and Veterinary Sciences at the 
University of Adelaide, SA, Australia.  
* Grateful thanks are extended to Ms Anne Schillmoller at Southern Cross University for editorial review of this 
work, in addition to her encouragement and inspiration.  
2





 Humane Research Australia (HRA), Statistics: Animal use in research & teaching, Australia 2011 
< http://www.humaneresearch.org.au/statistics/>. 
5
 See, e.g., Australian Research Council (ARC), About ARC (18
th
 September 2013) < http://www.arc.gov.au/>; 
National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC), About (16
th
 December 2013) 
<http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/>. 




complex cultural, social and personal beliefs.
6
 The government has sought to respond to this 
ethical minefield by creating a framework designed to address concerns around this issue, but 
allowing such use in ways which it believes are broadly acceptable to the community.
7
 
Accordingly, does the current system adequately protect animal welfare, or does a cloak of 
intransparency
8
 hide serious underlying actual, or potential animal welfare concerns? 
This paper does not attempt to discuss the pros or cons of research using animals. It 
assumes the practice exists with conditional approval of the wider population. As such, the 
regulatory system in place must protect animal welfare to the greatest extent possible within 
this paradigm.  
The legal framework surrounding the use of animals for scientific purposes within 
Australia will be discussed, and contrasted with some international jurisdictions. The author 
will then discuss some key issues with the current system based on personal observation, 
international comparison and literature review. Finally, an examination of potential reforms 
will be undertaken. The author will argue that the system at present fails to protect welfare 
and that reform is required.  
 
2. The Australian Regulatory Framework 
Under the Australian federal system, animal welfare responsibility is devolved to the states.
9
 
All states and territories have statutes designed to protect animals from cruelty, and in more 
recent times to promote welfare.
10
 This overarching legislation covers all fields of animal use. 
Additionally, most of these acts have specific clauses pertaining to research animals.
11
 New 
South Wales (NSW) adopts a different legislative framework to all other states and territories 
by the use of a separate additional statute dedicated to the regulation of research animal use.
12
 
This delegation of authority is provided for in the primary animal protection act by allowing a 
defence to prosecution for a cruelty offence should the provisions of the Animal Research Act 
1985 (NSW) be followed.
13
 Statutory interpretation of the opening wording of this section, 
which states that the defence applies ‘in the course of, and for the purpose of carrying out 
animal research’ suggests that there may be situations where the infliction of cruelty directed 
towards a research animal, which can be established as being outside the parameters of the 
research project, may still be prosecuted under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 
(NSW). However, no case authority for this assertion exists. 
                                                          
6
 Margaret Rose and Elizabeth Grant, 
‘
Australia's ethical framework for animals used in research and teaching’ 




 Ibid.  
8
 Siobhan O’Sullivan, ‘Transparency in Australian animal research regulation- How are we doing?’ (2008) 1 
Australian Animal Protection Law Journal 57. 
9
 Under the Australian Constitution s 51 there is no head of power for animal welfare. 
10
 Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW); Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 (Vic); Animal 
Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld); Animal Welfare Act 1985 (SA); Animal Welfare Act 2002 (WA); Animal 
Welfare Act 1993 (Tas); Animal Welfare Act 1992 (ACT); Animal Welfare Act (NT).  
11
 See, e.g., Animal Welfare Act 1985 (SA) s 16; Animal Welfare Act 2002 (WA) pt 2; Animal Welfare Act 1992 
(ACT) pt 4.  
12
 Animal Research Act 1985 (NSW).  
13
 Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW), s 24 (1)(e). 




Whilst there does appear to be considerable variability in the extent of statutory 
provisions relating to animals in research across the jurisdictions,
14
 unity is provided by 
referral to a code of practice, the Australian code for the care and use of animals for scientific 
purposes (‘the Code’).
15
 The Code provides specific detail over and above that provided in 
the animal protection acts pertaining to research animals. It does this using a principles-based 
approach, setting the outcome to be achieved yet allowing the user to determine the optimum 
method to achieve this. In general, this document receives its regulatory power by adoption 
under the state’s delegated animal welfare legislation,
16
 or through administrative controls, 
for example referral to it in licenses issued to research establishments. Administrative 
controls in this area of animal use abound, and can include the issuance of mandatory 




The legislation and code seek to achieve a balance which acknowledges that animal 
interests are subjugated to human interests, but attempts to limit their use and suffering 
through safeguards provided in the various regulatory provisions.
18
 Thus, the jurisprudential 
ethical foundation is incontrovertibly utilitarian.
19
  One other ethical framework features 
highly in this area, with particularly frequent mention in the code. The Three R’s refers to 
‘replacement’ of animals with non-sentient alternatives, ‘reduction’ of animal use, and 
‘refinement’ of procedures to minimise suffering.
20
 
Regulatory styles form a continuum ranging between punitive forms aimed at 
deterrence, and persuasive forms where cooperation and education predominate. 
21
 
Compromise is achieved through using a combination of these. 
22
 Enforced self-regulation 
operates towards the persuasive end of this scale and is the system adopted in Australia for 
regulation of animal use for scientific purposes. The theory suggests that institutions should 
take an active role in drawing up the rules under which they will operate,
23
 and be responsible 
for ensuring compliance with them, with little government intervention.
24
 The only 
governmental role is in verification that the internal controls are adequate by the use of 
government inspections, and in New South Wales through site visits and inspections by the 
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Animal Research Review Panel.
25
 In practice, researchers assume primary responsibility for 
animals on their studies, with a degree of vicarious responsibility taken by their employers. 
Central enforcement activities differ between states but may include inclusion of 
government appointed personnel on code external review panels,
26
 or routine accreditation 




3. The International Regulatory Landscape 
3.1. The European Union 
The EU and the Council of Europe both provide documents concerning the use of animals in 
research. These include EU Directive 2010/63/EU,
28
 and the European Convention for the 
protection of vertebrate animals used for experimental and other scientific purposes.
29
 The 
former document is not directly binding on member states in this format but requires adoption 
into domestic legislation. Unlike EU Regulations, Directives are only binding as to their 
outcomes and the member state can ascertain the optimal way to achieve such outcomes. On 
this basis, it is evidently feasible for member states to adopt standards which are higher than 
those required by the Directive. Hence the harmonisation brought about through this 
regulatory format merely provides a minimum threshold or level playing field across member 
states. It should be noted that the overriding purpose of this document as expounded in (1) is 
to provide further detailed rules over and above those provided in the previous Directive 
(86/609) to reduce disparities between member states which are ‘ liable to constitute barriers 
to trade in products and substances, the development of which involves experiments on 
animals’. This opening paragraph provides clear evidence of the overriding motive in drafting 
which might suggest a cautionary use of this document when referring to animal protection.   
The Convention has been ratified by the EU as a whole and several other states, acting 
through the Council of Europe. Despite the extension beyond EU borders, providing a farther 
–reaching effect, it has no legislative credence and essentially forms a set of guidelines to 
follow.  However, the text of the Directive does largely follow that of the Convention.  
The Directive clearly sets out the type of animals to be covered, which includes all non-
human vertebrates and cephalopods as well as foetal forms. It provides a detailed description 
of the type of procedures encompassed by the term ‘experimental and other scientific 
purposes’, doing so by using an exclusionary approach which lists those areas of animal use 
not covered by the provisions.
30
 It also sets itself a lofty goal of representing: an important 
step towards achieving the final goal of full replacement of procedures on live animals for 
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scientific and educational purposes as soon as it is scientifically possible to do so.
31
 However 
it fails to use the commonly recognised term of ‘ethical review’ in regard to the decision-
making procedure for approval of projects. There is however provision of this through the 




Whilst adopting EU legislation as a foundation,
33
 the UK animal research legislation 
has been considered the most rigorous in the world.
34
 The Animals (Scientific Procedures) 
Act 1986 (UK) provides for a centrally administered licensing system which authorises 
scientific procedures at three levels, namely authorisation of; the person carrying out the 
procedures, the program of work and the establishment where animals are held and 
procedures performed. A special inspectorate is responsible for granting licences and 
inspecting premises.
35
 The system has been criticised by scientists for its complexity and 
bureaucratic nature with concern that, through exclusion of ethics committee involvement, it 
renders the decision making capacity in the hands of those with little ethical training, who are 
distanced from the true issues.
36
 However, an ethical review process is required to be 
established.
37
 Whilst the form of this is not dictated it is likely to be represented by a 
committee with designated members, similar to other countries’ ethics committees. In reality 
all protocol applications are required to be considered by this process prior to submission to 
the Home Office, and there is mention of balancing the input arising from this review with 
those of the inspectorate.
38
 The advantages provided by this central oversight in terms of 
uniformity of decision-making are considerable. This uniformity would be expected to create 
clear minimum welfare standards, and enhance transparency to the general public.  
 
3.2 United States of America 
With the adoption of a self-regulation model and the federal system, the US is an excellent 
comparative model for Australia. On the face-of-it the system appears relatively simple with 
animal use being governed by two federal acts; the Animal Welfare Act 1966 (AWA)
39
 and 
the Health Research Extension Act 1985.
40
 However, scratching beneath the surface reveals a 
complex array of policies, codes and guidance documents covering different animal species, 
types of institutions and funding arrangements.
41
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The advantages brought about by a federal system of governance are largely negated by 
the complexity and overlapping nature of these additional documents, and the fact that the 
majority of animals used in research are exempted from protection. This includes cold-
blooded animals such as fish, and rats and mice through exemption under the delegated 
legislation.
42
 Additionally, the AWA is only concerned with the care of protected animals in 
research establishments, as opposed to the scientific validity of procedures performed upon 
them.
43
 Inspectors are appointed to provide central oversight and control.
44
  
Much criticism of the US system has been advanced by animal advocates based on the 
variable protection afforded to different animal species, the lack of prescriptive regulation, 
and the absence of ethical review. However, whilst this assertion is correct based on 
consideration of statutory requirements, the use of self-enforcement also plays an important 
role. In the US the main medical research funding body is the National Institute of Health 
which administers the Public Health Service (PHS) policy. Non-compliance with this renders 
the institution at risk of losing access to this valuable funding source, and hence acts as the 
‘carrot’ for compliance. PHS policy requires the formation of an ethics committee equivalent, 
the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC), plus adherence to a detailed and 
prescriptive manual pertaining to research animal care and use, the ‘Guide’.
45
 Thus, in 
conjunction with the AWA, this policy effectively brings most species and animal procedures 
under control of an IACUC. It is also of note that a large majority of US research facilities 




4. Issues Identified 
4.1. The Code  
Returning to the Australian jurisdiction, the main focus of attention needs to be directed at the 
Code since this is the principle governing document for animal use in research and contains 
the detail pertaining to animal care and ethical review. Whilst the Code itself is a national 
document, it is of note that it sits beneath State and Territory delegated animal welfare 
legislation and therefore has no Federal regulatory power. In fact, the provisions therein have 
no ability to be enforced first-hand; instead acting in the form of a defence (or lack-off) to 
cruelty prosecution under the primary Act.  
The Code in this area of animal use appears to provide refreshing simplicity and 
uniformity to Australia’s complex state-based animal protection system. As a document 
drafted with input from the industry itself, as well as animal welfare groups, and refined in 
light of public consultation, surely use of this document represents best practice in animal 
research? However, a closer look at the primary legislation in a number of jurisdictions 
suggests that there are a range of legal loopholes and inconsistencies which suggest that the 
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Code may not actually be as compulsory as first thought. For instance in NSW, ‘the 
regulations may prescribe a Code of Practice’
47
 contra an ‘animal research authority shall not 
authorise, or purport to authorise, the carrying out of animal research otherwise than: …..in 
accordance with the Code of Practice’.
48
 The amended regulations do however stipulate the 
Code as the prescribed one for the purposes of this Act.
49
 Yet, the regulations may allow this 
to be adopted ‘wholly or in part, and with or without modification’.
50
 
Similarly in South Australia, the sole mention of the Code in the primary act refers to 
licensing and again implies discretion by use of the word ‘may’.
51
 This clause (as in NSW) 
suggests that the Minister may take a piecemeal approach to code incorporation.  
Additionally in this jurisdiction the Code is not one listed as a prescribed code under the 
regulations.
52
 Similar referral to regulations and use of discretionary language is also seen in 
other states.
53
 Whilst this finding is disappointing in terms of its effect on public transparency 
and country-wide harmonisation, it could simply have arisen out of political motivation to 
retain the state’s legislature-making ability. It should also be considered that for large 
academic institutions the risk of loss of government funding due to non-Code compliance 
may be a bigger stick than any penalty applied under the relevant state legislation. Not so 
perhaps for non-government funded bodies?  
Setting aside the above and turning to the document itself, a cursory glance reveals an 
abundance of well-considered principles and reassuringly definitive statements such as, 
‘…the use of animals for scientific purposes must have scientific merit’.
54
 However, it is not 
quite so clear how this document ensures that these admirable sentiments are achieved. 
Without even delving into the substance of the document it is evident that there are two 
general problems which have both legislative and practical effect. Firstly, the language used 
is littered with the terms ‘must’ and ‘should’ which to the ordinary lay person are often 
regarded as synonymous.
55
 However, the Code uses the former to imply an obligation and the 
latter to imply a strongly recommended provision. Other expressions used include: regularly, 
suitable, essential, adequate, and necessary and they are never defined.
56
 Secondly, the 
document is a classic example of a performance-based document,
57
 in character with the self-
regulatory enforcement model it operates under.  Such documents provide the outcomes that 
need to be achieved and allow the responsible personnel to decide the optimal way of 
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achieving this. For example: ‘animals must be provided with accommodation, physical and 
social environmental conditions, food, water and care to meet species-specific or strain-
specific physical and behavioural needs’.
58
 This can be contrasted with a prescriptive 
document such as the US Guide which provides tables of specific data on numerous 
husbandry issues, including the temperature at which different species should be housed, and 
the minimum cage floor required by different weight of rodent.
59
 Advocates of the 
performance-based model cite advantages such as reduced regulatory burden, consideration 
of local factors, and the fostering of a culture of care through active staff involvement.
60
 It is 
also clear that in such a system it is feasible for standards above that of the minimum to be 
implemented. However, the reverse also applies, and it would be exceptionally difficult to 
mount a legal challenge for non-compliance based on the Code wording above. The 
behavioural needs of animals are widely disputed by eminent animal welfare scientists,
61
 is it 
reasonable to expect researchers and animal carers to be fully cognisant of these needs, and 
readily able to implement provisions to safeguard them? Interestingly, the EU Directive, 
perhaps in recognition of this issue, has created a new statutory role for a person ‘to ensure 
that staff dealing with animals have access to information specific to the species housed in 
the establishment‘.
62
 An efficient use of performance-based documents requires not only a 
highly educated and experienced workforce, clear reporting lines and an exemplary 
organisational culture of care, but an efficient system of outcome monitoring and 
improvement.
63
 Are we secure in the knowledge that this is present in most scientific 
institutions in Australia?  
 
4.2. Ethics Committees 
Animal Ethics Committees (AECs) are of paramount importance in this system of 
governance. They have been designed to provide community accountability by the inclusion 
of a ‘lay’ member and a person with a demonstrated commitment to animal welfare.
64
 This 
committee composition may make our AECs superior to those internationally.
65
 
AECs are sanctioned to evaluate research proposals to determine the fundamental 
question of their necessity.
66
 However, there are numerous factors which affect their ability to 
do this. This includes the quality of the protocols submitted, the individual ideologies of 
members, and the willingness of members to voice their concerns.
67
 More troublingly 
members are being asked to make decisions involving complex scientific procedures and 
statistical validity which are far outside their expertise. The nature of today’s scientific 
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pursuits is so variable and specialised that even the scientist member is unlikely to bring 
detailed knowledge on every protocol considered.  
The lack of centralised oversight leads to a number of other concerns. Firstly, different 
committees’ decisions can be highly variable and one proposal may receive different 
outcomes on consideration by each. Since committees are made up of individuals who bring 
their own experience and prejudices to the table this result is hardly surprising. It does 
however do little for public accountability. The lack of detailed prescriptive guidelines on 
minimum recommendations or refinements does not aid the situation. The status quo when 
there is disagreement amongst members is also unclear. The Code requires that decisions are 
made on the basis of consensus.
68
 This, it seems provides a good welfare safeguard and 
allows all members a voice. However, this safeguard is defeated, since ‘if consensus cannot 
be reached after compromise, then decisions can proceed by majority’.
69
 Still, the broad 
stated aim of the Code that, ‘ the use of animals for scientific purposes must have scientific or 
educational merit; must aim to benefit humans, animals or the environment; and must be 
conducted with integrity…’
70
 renders it unlikely that a consensus in decision-making could 
not be achieved.  
Despite AECs functioning as government-appointed committees under most state acts, 
their retention of independence may also be called into question especially when chairs and 
members may be senior university officials responsible for other conflicting portfolios. This 





4.3. Training and Competence 
A key determinant in promotion of animal welfare (and scientific outcomes) during research 
procedures is the competence of the research personnel carrying out the procedure. 
Competence is defined in the Code as ‘the consistent application of knowledge and skill to 
the standard of performance required regarding the care and use of animals. It embodies the 
ability to transfer and apply knowledge and skill to new situations and environments’. It has 
however been suggested that the main element of ‘competency’ is a person’s behavioural 
characteristics which underlie their competent performance.
72
 Attainment of competence is 
likely to come about through a combination of formal training, supervision and experience 
which are elements that legislation can only impact upon minimally. However, law can 
provide the tools to mandate formal training requirements, and for implementation of systems 
for its review.  
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The Code requires that all people who use and care for animals must be competent in 
the procedures performed or supervised by others with the requisite competency.
73
 Some 
responsibility for this is devolved to the institution which must ensure that they provide 
‘adequate resources for appropriate education, training, and assessment of competence of 
investigators, and certification of such competence to the satisfaction of the AEC.
74
 There is 
no further elucidation on what topics should be considered as part of training programs or 
how competency outcomes should be measured. Also of concern is that on closer analysis of 
the Code wording surrounding training it is clear that the Institution’s main responsibility is 
to offer training to investigators, and not to ensure that they have availed themselves of it.
75
 
As already discussed, the use of undefined terms such as ‘adequate’ and ‘appropriate’, and 
the outcome requirement of being to the ‘satisfaction of the AEC’ provides a large degree of 
flexibility and variability in terms of what resources may be offered and processes accepted 
under the Code. This contrasts with the European model which appears relatively advanced 
by the requiring of a person(s) on site with responsibility for ‘ensuring that staff are educated, 
competent and continuous trained’.
76
 In addition, investigators should be supervised until 
they have demonstrated the requisite competence. The UK has formalised this requirement by 
the creation of a new statutory role, the ‘Named Training and Competence Officer’.
77
 The EU 
Directive requires that member states publish their minimum requirements with respect to 
education and training and their requirements for obtaining, maintaining and demonstrating 
competence.
78
A list of topics for inclusion as part of educational programs is also provided. 
79
 
Another interesting and relatively unexplored area is the requirements for attainment of 
surgical competence during research procedures, and even the ability of researchers to be able 
to legally perform surgery on a research animal. Ordinarily, the performance of surgery on an 
animal could be construed as an act of cruelty since this would be expected to cause pain. 
80
 It 
would be expected that the general defence to cruelty for procedures conducted in the 
pursuance of research outcomes would apply to research surgical procedures.
81
 This however 
requires consideration of this exemption in the relevant state legislation governing veterinary 
practitioners and the practice of acts of veterinary science. This is provided for in NSW,
82
  
but does not appear to be provided for specifically in all jurisdictions.
83
  
Given the previous discussion, and that the legality of performance of surgery on 
research animals appears to be a grey area, the mandating of surgical training for researchers 
should receive even greater priority. It however receives no greater emphasis in the Code 
than any other forms of training despite the serious adverse welfare outcomes that can arise 
due to negligent performance of it. In the centralised UK system of governance all those 
researchers wishing to perform surgery on animals must provide evidence of completion of a 
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specific surgical training course in order to satisfy the Home Office requirements for issuance 
of a personal licence.
84
 The wording of the US Guide in respect to training is analogous to the 
Code requiring that investigators are trained and competent, however it does provide specific 
recommendations for training or qualifications that should be expected of various types of 
staff members involved in research. Nonetheless, many of these requirements are listed in 




4.4. Veterinary Care  
Somewhat uniquely, in comparison to international counterparts, there is no requirement 
under either primary or delegated legislation to appoint a dedicated veterinary surgeon who is 
responsible for the health and wellbeing of research animals. Instead there is a Code 
requirement for institutions to ensure ‘availability and access to veterinary advice for the 
management and oversight of a program of veterinary care, quality management and project 
design to safeguard animal wellbeing’.
86
 There are other parts of the Code where veterinary 
input is suggested, for example in providing advice on animal health protocols,
87
 or in 
veterinarians fulfilling roles as animal facility managers,
88
 and the Institutions should 
consider appointment of personnel with veterinary qualifications, but at no point is there a 
requirement for an appointed individual with a relatively fixed set of responsibilities. This 
contrasts with the statutory appointed Named Veterinary Surgeon role in the UK, the 
designated veterinarian of the EU and attending veterinarians in the US.
89
 It must be 
considered that the public has a general duty of care to seek veterinary advice for sick 
animals in their charge under relevant state animal protection legislation,
90
 and it would be 
expected that a parallel duty would exist for animals in research. This is probably provided 
for by the wording of the Code used above, but given the characteristic separation of research 
animal regulation from all other animal uses, it would be beneficial to specifically establish 
this duty to seek advice, and strengthen the role of the veterinarian in research environments. 
The role of the Named Veterinary Surgeon in the UK is well-defined by the use of supportive 
guidance notes issued by the Veterinary Surgeons professional body.
91
 This not only aids 
those acting in the role, but provides another impetus to perform the role competently; the 
bringing of the role under the remit of professional conduct rules. Other international 
jurisdictions also make reference to the specific expertise required of laboratory animal 
veterinarians and training programs which allow attainment of this.
92
 This, no doubt included, 
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in recognition of the diverse range of species and husbandry practices encountered in 
laboratory animal practice, as distinct from routine veterinary general practice.  
 
4.5. Enforcement 
Effective enforcement requires mechanisms for detecting legislative breaches and a readiness 
to respond appropriately.  This may be through administrative sanction (suspension or 
revocation of licenses) or criminal prosecution.
93
 The Code sets out institutional requirements 
for dealing with complaints or non-compliance in its principles-based fashion. However, 
what remains largely uncertain is the process for detecting issues in the absence of whistle-
blower reports. The majority of states, with NSW as the notable exception, employ little use 
of outside inspectors and rely on internal monitoring of compliance.
94
 
Institutions rarely report on the format used for their internal monitoring of compliance. 
The Code notes that compliance must be achieved through the AEC,
95
 but as a committee 
composed of a range of internal and external members that may meet only several times a 
year, it is unlikely that they would have the day-to-day level of oversight required to ensure 
compliance. In most cases then, the role of detecting and investigating compliance or welfare 
issues falls to animal facility staff, and the facility veterinarian (often called the animal 
welfare officer). This latter individual occupies no statutory role, in contrast with the UK,
96
 
and is merely a suggested institutional appointment under the Code.
97
 There also appears to 
be an inherent conflict of interest in using such internal compliance models. Firstly, these 
people work closely with the researchers and may lose their impartial decision-making 
ability. Additionally, in order to safeguard animal welfare and prevent animal suffering we 
need researchers to consult veterinarians for advice, and not fear punitive action should they 
do so. This has been resolved in some large US institutions by employing clinical 
veterinarians, in addition to compliance officers.
98
 
AECs are required to participate in facility inspections but this is at a frequency to be 
determined by themselves,
99
 and in reality is unlikely to be greater than semi-annually. These 
visits are usually announced due to planning requirements. Visit outcomes may show 
inconsistency across time and across institutions.
100
 Committee members are not trained 
auditors, and with no checklist of criteria, outcomes will largely be dependent on individuals’ 
knowledge and biases. This issue would be resolved if the legislation was more prescriptive 
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Whilst most state acts empower inspectors to perform both routine and unannounced 
inspections,
102
 it is not clear how often this occurs in respect to research establishments. 
Given that this role is delegated to the RSPCA and the resource constraints of this 
organisation it is unlikely to be a frequent occurrence.
103
 The Code puts in place a system of 
external review that must be conducted at least once every four years.
104
 Whilst this is a 
useful form of assessment for the institution and could improve practice, there is no 
requirement for recommendations to be implemented.
105
  
The greatest test of enforcement strength is perhaps seen in the number of prosecutions 
or legal proceedings commenced. Proceedings have been commenced in NSW in relation to 
animal supply for research, but on no other grounds.
106
 The previously mentioned Charles 
Darwin University case may have been prosecuted under the Northern Territory Act, 
107
 but 
the time limit for mounting proceedings was missed.
108
 Aside from this no other case law in 
this area could be sourced. It has been suggested that if such low prosecutions levels were 
occurring in other areas of self-regulation, that serious concerns would be raised about the 




5. Areas for Reform 
The critique above provides a number of areas for possible reform. These range between 
being evidently possible, to requiring some significant shift in political and legal thinking. A 
number are considered below.  
If we are set on the use of a document such as the Code it should at least be given true 
legal effect in its entirety to allow national harmonisation of the system. States need to trust 
in the system of code writing and consultation, and remove clauses in their primary acts 
which allow them to retain decision-making power relating to its implementation. Rendering 
compliance with the Codes mandatory through the use of administrative means such as 
licensing arrangements would achieve a similar goal. Although, this would not allow the 
range of enforcement mechanisms currently available under statute. A superior solution, 
although requiring considerable jurisprudential development, would be to bring the 
provisions of the Code out of the delegated legislation and place them in the state’s primary 
animal protection act. This change would allow Code provisions to be enforced directly by 
rendering a breach of them to be an offence under the Act. Criminal penalties existing under 
the Act could therefore be applied. This contrasts with the current indirect enforcement of 
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provisions by use of them as a defence to prosecution. An elevated position in the legislative 
hierarchy would also give prominence to the sentiments contained within provisions and 
serve as a beacon for their importance. 
Again, controversial, but it is asserted that the principles-based format of the Code is 
not effective at safeguarding welfare in the current research management climate within 
Australia. Consideration should be given to creating a more prescriptive-based document 
based on science-based recommendations used overseas. Indeed there is precedent for this, 
with such a document already existing in Victoria.
110
 Provision of more rigid training 
guidelines within the Code should be a priority and consideration should turn to the 
administrative systems that would aid their implementation. Strengthening the role of the 
veterinarian would also further benefit animal welfare and scientific outcomes.  
The cost-benefit analysis role of AECs would be made easier by the inclusion of a 
mandatory statistician and data-mining role on the committee. Mandating a pre-review of 
applications for scientific validity by a well-constituted committee of expert scientists would 
also be beneficial. The background of the AEC chair needs further consideration by 
institutions and committee-appointment personnel in government, to ensure that the 
individual can maintain institutional independence, yet is positioned well-enough to receive 
institutional support in their role.  
The Code should be more prescriptive about how compliance may best be monitored. 
Suggestions include independent compliance inspectors, increased frequency of AEC facility 
visitations, and the use of specific checklists when visiting facilities to ensure standards are 
in-keeping with international best practice.  In terms of public accountability, government 
resourcing of more external inspections (and the reporting of these) or encouraging 
organisations to join voluntary best-practice accreditation schemes would be welcomed. The 
latter may be achieved through some agreed-upon trade-off in terms of reduced governmental 
intervention. Greater use of the punitive criminal sanctions available in the framework for 
cases of clear animal cruelty, would help assure the public about the use of animals in 
research, and would reduce the risk of regulatory capture occurring.
111
 
Australia is not unique in facing such problems; many issues are experienced overseas, 
or are in fact problems in animal law in general. The very nature of self-regulation suggests 
that some institutions will have better standards than others due to a variety of factors. 
However, law should create an equal playing-field, even if that merely sets minimum 
standards, which are arguably preferential to no enforceable standards. It is concluded that 
there are inadequacies in the current system which have the potential to impact on animal 
welfare.  Additionally, in many cases these issues could be easily rectified if the forces for 
change were present.         
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